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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
JENNIFER ORYALL,

Case No: 20170110-CA

Defendant/ Appellant.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED ORYALL'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A. Oryall's constitutionality challenge on appeal is sufficient

The State's first argument is that Oryall has failed to challenge the district
court's alternative reasoning and thus fails in her appeal. See State's Brief at 1014. According to the State, because the district court's ruling had two bases, and
Oryall has only argued one basis was unconstitutional, her appeal must be
~

rejected. The State cites a number of cases in support of the theory that this Court
should not reverse the district court when the appellant only challenges one of
several grounds. State's brief at 10-11. What the State's brief does not do is
examine, in any meaningful way, how the district court's "alternative and
independent" basis is alternative or independent at all. That is because it is not
alternative or independent, it is merely a continuation of the court's analysis of
the constitutionality of the search. Examining what the district court actually said
in its ruling is useful in deciding whether the court made two independent and
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alternative rulings. Where the State has failed to do such an examination, Oryall
will do so now. Then Oryall will examine the cases cited by the State to decide,
given the nature of the district court's ruling, whether there are independent and
alternative bases in the ruling. Spoiler alert, there is not. Oryall urges the Court
reject the State's argument and reach the question at stake in the case.
1.

The district court's ruling

The district court's ruling begins with a discussion of the Fourth
Amendment and the validity a traffic stop based on reasonable articulable
suspicion. R.068. The court then discusses, although perhaps inaccurately,
Oryall's claim that a random license plate "check" is a search protected by the
constitution and the GRAMA statute. R.069. The court discusses the concepts of
"search" and the expectation of privacy in relation to the court's conclusion that
-officer!s--inspection--ofthe-vehicle-registration database~· R:070. The-·court~aisn
discusses other statutes which deal with the collection and distribution of driver
license information R.070-71. The court implicitly concludes that the officer's
access of the vehicle registration information and the driver license information
was not a search because these statutes authorize the police to access them.
R.071.

The court then says,
"Even if the license check is considered to be a search, it is the view
of this Court that the search was reasonable. There is a public policy
argument which would allow the use of these records by law
enforcement officers in the normal course of their duties. GRAMA
explicitly protects privacy and personal information of Utah
residents; however, the Uniform Driver Act also describes an
2
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important public safety interest in safe roadways where only
properly licensed and insured drivers operate vehicles."
R.071. According to the district court, because privacy interests and public safety
conflict, "privacy interests should be subordinate to the public safety interests"
because limiting the police access to these records "would significantly hamper
enforcement of the Uniform Driver License Act." R.071.
2.

Oryall has adequately challenged the reasonableness of
the warrantless search

Subsection 3 of Oryall's initial brief is titled "this was an unreasonable and
warrantless search". Appellant's Brief at 13. This section argued that searches
must be authorized by a warrant or must be justified by exigent circumstances,
and that no such exigency is present to excuse the warrantless search in this case.
Appellant's Brief at 13-4 (citing State v. Rigby, 2016 UT App 42). Despite this
argument, the State claims Oryall was obliged on appeal to separately and
specifically challenge the district court's conclusion that public policy makes the
search reasonable. The State asserts that failing to argue that public policy does
not make the search reasonable put Oryall's challenge "beyond the reach of
further appellate review." State's Brief at 14 (citing Benns v. Career Serv.,

2011

UT App 362, ,I2, 264 P.3d 563). But this criticism distorts the doctrine of
independent and alternative justification (as explained above), ignores the
validity of Oryall's reasonableness challenge, and illegitimately elevates the idea
of public policy.
~

3
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When Oryall argues that the search was unreasonable under the
circumstances, it is a direct challenge to the district court's finding that the search
was reasonable because of pubic policy. When Oryall argues that no exigent
circumstances justified a warrantless search, it is a direct challenge to the district
court's finding that no warrant was necessary because enforcing the driver license
laws justifies an exception to the constitution. Oryall's appeal spelled out the
challenge, the district court was wrong because this search was not reasonable,
and public policy did not make it reasonable because it did not create an exigent
circumstance, which is required to create an exception to the warrant

~

requirement.

If the court disagrees that Oryall's appellate challenge to the
reasonableness of the search and the lack of exigent circumstances does not
-•1ulequatelyaadtess-the district couii's public polici"discussion, wliTch ·1r sllou1a,
then it can reject the State's claims because the district court's ruling is not two
independent and alternative justifications. Instead, it is two parts of the same
analysis.
3. Independent and alternative justification cases

The State claims that the district court's decision is two-fold, and because
there are two facets to the decision each must be separately challenged on appeal.
~

From the State's perspective, first the court found that Oryall's motion failed
because the exceptions within GRAMA and other relevant statutes preclude a

4
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conclusion that individuals have any privacy interest in the information. Because
the data isn't private, accessing the data isn't a search.
But the State says when the district court went on to discuss the public
~

policy in allowing the police to search private information in order to enforce
driver license law, this reason is independent and alternative to the
constitutionality question and must be separately raised. Oryall disputes that
these are independent and alternative justifications, and that her brief
challenging the constitutionality of the search adequately raises the entirety of

vi>

the district court's ruling.
Support for Oryall's position can be made by reference to the cases cited by
the State. These cases, and the reasons courts have considered an appellant's
appellate arguments insufficient, reveal that in this case there was not two
independent and alternative bases for the district court's denial below and that
Oryall is not obligated to treat the district court's ruling that way.
The State first cites Wm. Douglas Horne Family Revocable Trust v.

Wardley/McLachlan Dev. LLC, 2013 UT App 129, 304 P.3d 99 in support of it
~

claim that Oryall has failed to challenge both of the district court's rulings. But
reference to that case is worth a review of the case, rather than just one line,
because it describes why the appellant's appeal was deficient. Understanding the
relationship, or in reality the independence, between the trial court's
justifications in Wardley, leads to an understanding of the interconnectedness
and dependence of the issues in this case. Unfmtunately, the State's brief makes

5
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no attempt to understand these issues, and merely hopes this Court will blindly
follow the one-line citation, assuming the facts are similar to this case. They
aren't. Oryall now discusses these cases in more detail to explain why the trial
court's "public policy" discussion in this case is no an independent and
alternative basis from Oryall's challenge to the constitutionality of the search in
this case.
In Wardley the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of a
defendant who was alleged to have violated the terms of a settlement agreement.
Essentially, the defendant's (or their associates) owed the plaintiffs a bunch of
money and there was an agreement about how that money would be repaid. After
all the payments were made, the plaintiffs informed the defendants that their
obligations were satisfied. Later on, the plaintiffs discovered an accounting error

· that revealed lhe~aefendahts had actually ··missed one-payment, so the plaintiffs
asked the unpaid remainder, plus interest, be paid. The defendants refused, and a
lawsuit was filed. Wardley, 2013 UT App 129, ,r3-4.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal the plaintiffs claimed the trial court was wrong

~

because it incorrectly considered the contractual issue of "accord and
satisfaction" .1 Id., at ,IS. The defendant's responded to the appeal by claiming that

In Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court defined "accord and satisfaction" as arising "when the parties to a
contract agree that a different performance, to be made in substitution of the
performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under
1

6
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if accord and satisfaction is the only thing the plaintiff complains about, the
appeal should be rejected because the trial court made its decision on an
additional, unchallenged ground. Id. This Court then looked to the record and
found that the trial court issued its decision based on two theories. First the trial
court found, at the time the defendants made the final payment, and the plaintiffs
acknowledged the debt was paid in full, there was "tender and acceptance." 2 Id.,
at ,In. Second, the trial court found, "in the alternative" there was "accord and
satisfaction." The Court of appeals also found this distinction, between "tender
~

and acceptance" and "accord and satisfaction", in the trial court's written ruling.
Having found these two bases, this Court accepted the defendant's appellate
argument because, in fact, the plaintiffs appeal did not challenge the trial court's
ruling on "tender and acceptance."
What underlies this Court's acceptance of the defendant's position in
Wardley is an understanding of the independence and separation between the
doctrines of "tender and acceptance" and "accord and satisfaction." If these issues
were not independent, if the trial court's reliance upon each could not have been

the original agreement. The substituted agreement calling for the different
performance discharges the obligation created under the original agreement. The
elements essential to contracts generally must be present in a contract of accord
and satisfaction, including offer and acceptance, competent parties, and
consideration."
2
The idea of "tender and acceptance" is distinct from "accord and satisfaction."
As opposed to creating a new or replacement agreement (accord and
satisfaction), when there is a disagreement between the parties and one party
tenders an offer, some change to the agreement, the other party can accept that
offer, thus changing the agreement. The distinction between the two seems to be
7
~
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said to be completely alternative and separate from one another, then there
would be no reason to criticize the plaintiffs' appellate argument. But, because
these two doctrines are independent, because they did not rely on each other,
because criticism or even rejection of one justification would have no effect on
the validity of the other, this Court rationally concluded that to rule upon the one
justification would have no impact upon the trial court's order. Even if the Court
found the trial court was wrong about "accord and satisfaction", because it was
not being called upon to consider whether the trial court was also wrong about
"tender and acceptance" any appellate opinion would be powerless to affect the
disposition below.
The take away from Wardley is that the doctrine for which the State cites
the case depends entirely upon substance of the supposed alternative and
-independent bases Tortlie fria1 court's-decision. lfthe iiiriltiple-bases are -iri-faet
separate, independent, and alternative, then the appellate decision to refrain
from addressing a singular basis makes sense. But if these bases are not
independent, if a decision on one basis does impact and have power to influence
the decision below, then an appellant's attempts to prevent review should be
fruitless.
The State also cites Salt Lake City v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp.,
2013 UT App 30, 297 P .3d 38, where this Court refused to resolve the issue raised

on appeal because the trial court's challenged order rested on alternative
grounds. There, the trial court refused to grant attorney's fees to a defendant

8
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"principally on its finding that the County had not acted in bad faith. But it also
rejected the request" for attorney's fees because the defendant "fell under the pro
se litigant rule ... "3 Butler, 2013 UT App 30, 129. The defendant had not
challenged that the pro se litigant rule did not apply, so the Court refused to
address the bad faith claim because doing so would not adequately address the
challenged order.
Again, like Wardley, the Court in Butler recognized that the substance of
the bad faith claim was completely separate, totally independent from the
alternative justification of pro se litigant exception relied upon by the district
court. Because these two justifications were independent, if the appellate court
only addressed one of them, even if the court agreed with the appellant, the other
basis for the trial court's decision would still be in place. As the trial court
explained and this Court repeated, "it would not award attorney fees to [the
defendant] even 'assuming for the sake of argument that the Court did find the
bad faith standard had been met."' Butler, 130. That conclusion depends upon
the completely independent and separate nature of the two bases. Only because
Gii)

the bad faith claim and the pro se litigant exception were independent could the
appellate court avoid addressing the bad faith issue.

The pro se litigant rule prevents recovery of attorney's fees for individuals who
represent themselves, even when that person is an attorney. See Smith v.
Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992). Obviously, the prose litigant justification
for denying attorneys fees is completely independent and alternative to the bad
faith question.
3

9
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In State v Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988), an aggravated kidnapping
case, the defendant claimed the trial court erred in finding aggravating factors to
impose the maximum mandatory sentence. On appeal he argued that his conduct
was not extremely cruel or depraved beyond what is physically required to prove
the elements of the offense, so the maximum sentence should not have been
imposed. But when the Supreme Court looked to the record it found the trial
court based its decision to impose the maximum "on two aggravating
circumstances: (1) defendant's long and extensive criminal record of
aggressiveness and violence, including prior convictions; and (2) defendant's
extreme cruelty and depravity in this case ... " Lovell, 758 P.3d 909, 912-13.
Because the appeal only challenged the trial court's finding on cruelty and
depravity, and because the Supreme Court found the criminal history was a
-suttfcient agg'ravafor, tnere was no need fo address the Tssue-aYaU.- Caii lliere·oe
any doubt that the defendant's extensive history of violence prior to the case is
independent and alternative to the specific details of the case? No matter how
persuasive the defendant had been with respect to the facts of his case, it would
have no impact on the legitimacy of aggravation through his criminal past. This is
independent and alternative.
In State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, 95 P.3d 1216, the defendant
appealed from the trial court's refusal to accept a plea agreement he had made
with the State in a case where he was charged with Aggravated Robbery with an
enhancement for acting in concert with two or more others. According to the

IO
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prosecutor at the time, the plea was offered because there were facts in the case
that would not look good to the jury, so the offer was made to avoid the risk of
acquittal. Montiel,

2004

lIT App

242,

,I3. The trial court rejected the offer by

claiming that the court didn't "waive firearms enhancements, folks. You plead
them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there was some mistake in the
pleading." Id., ,I4. On appeal the defendant claimed this refusal was an abuse of
discretion. But this Court, looked to the record and found support for the
conclusion that the trial court's refusal was also based on fear that the sentence
for the proposed plea would be too lenient, and because the victim of the robbery
had not been consulted about the plea agreement.
As with each of the forgoing cases, refusing to accept a plea where the
victim had not been consulted is a separate, independent, and alternative
justification from the court's policy not to "waive firearms enhancements". There
can be little doubt about the distinctness, the independence, and alternativeness
of these two justifications. Even if this Court were convinced that such a policy
exceeded the trial court's discretion, it would not undermine the separate
justification for refusing the plea.
Each of these examples is distinct from the case the State is trying to make
here. The State wants this Court to find that the district court's review of whether
a search occurred was completely distinct from and independent of its conclusion
that public policy authorized throwing out the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the constitution. But unlike each of the cases cited by the State,

11
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the search question and the public policy exemption created by the court were
part of the same analysis. They were interdependent. They did not stand alone.
Thus, unlike the appellant's in these cases, Oryall's appellate challenge does not
fail for the fact that her initial brief does not spend a great deal of time
challenging the public policy behind make a new exception to the constitution.
B. The Utah Legislature can and did recognize a legitimate
expectation of privacy in personal data gathered by the
government

The remainder of the State's brief is an attempt to challenge the idea that
Oryall had an expectation of privacy in the records collected and stored by the
government. First, the State points to federal and cases from other states which
have declined to protect similar information under the Fourth Amendment or
other state constitutions. This is either a waste of time or misdirection. On
appeal, Oryall has not and will not claim that her right to privacy and protection
in these records stems from the Fourth Amendment or from the constitutions of
other states. Oryall acknowledges that the federal constitution has not been
interpreted to protect information held by third parties. This is a shame and it is
why Oryall turns to the Utah Constitution for its robust protection and
reasonable interpretation, as an alternative to the unruly and wavering
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Much of our most private information, the most intimate details of our
lives, are held by third parties. Oryall claims, and the Supreme Court of Utah has
recognized, that a legitimate expectation of privacy does not require a person to

12
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remove themselves from modern society. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415
(Utah 1991). One need not bury every private bit of information in the ground in
order to have an expectation of privacy. That which we reasonably expect to be
kept private, even when placed in the hands of third parties, is entitled to article
I, section 14 protection. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990),

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991).
With that in mind, the State challenges the idea that the Utah State
Legislature's recognition of the "right of privacy in relation to personal data
gathered by government entities" qualifies as recognition of a legitimate
expectation of privacy. See State's Brief at 22-25. The State argues that the
legislature cannot recognize an expectation of privacy when courts have not done
so. "[T]here was no pre-existing constitutional right of privacy in motor vehicle
and driver license records for the Legislature to recognize when it enacted
GRAMA." State's Brief at 23.
To be clear, Oryall has not claimed that the Utah Legislature recognized "a
pre-existing constitutional right to privacy in motor vehicle and driver license
records". See State's Brief at 23. Instead, Oryall's claim is that article I, section 14
creates a right to privacy in our "persons, houses, papers and effects" and those
things which we have a reasonable expectation of privacy. UTAH CONST. ART. I,
SECT. 14; Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990). There is no controversy here.
The next step is what the State misunderstands or refuses to acknowledge. That is
that the legislature, the duly elected representatives of the people of Utah,

13
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recognized that we have a reasonable expectation, even a constitutional
expectation, and "right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by
governmental entities."

UTAH CODE

§63G-2-102(1). The legislature did not

recognize a new right of privacy, the legislature recognized the legitimate
expectation of privacy. This distinction, whether misunderstood or ignored by the
State, is crucial and must not be overlooked.
Oryall maintains that the legislature can and does have the authority to

4t;;

have a say in what we have a legitimate expectation of privacy in. Otherwise that
question is left entirely to the courts, who can only make such pronouncements
when called upon by the specific facts of a case. And if courts reviewing specific
cases are the only way to have the legitimate expectations of privacy recognized,
our constitutional rights are subject to only be recognized by luck or
-happenstance~

-- - ~ --- --~

As argued in the opening brief, the legislature "is the branch of government

~

that is expressly designed to adjust our legal framework to reflect contemporary
context." See Appellant's Brief at 12 (citing Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006
UT 40, 1l 77, 140 P.3d 1235 (J. Durrant, concur)). Why the State would suggest
that the legislature is incapable or inadequate to express that the people of Utah
have a legitimate expectation of privacy is unclear. That function seems well
within the legislative role, to help the courts know what the will, and the mind,
and the expectations of the people are. Of course, that would not stop this Court
from concluding, upon proper examination, that the legislature is wrong, that

14
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~

people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information. But to
do so, when the legislature has purportedly spoken the will, and the mind, and
the expectations of the people would seem to require a very significant level of
proof that these expectations are not reasonable. This case contains no such
contrary evidence. Instead, the text of the GRAMA introduction statute is clear,
according to the legislature, the people of Utah have a reasonable expectation
that the personal information gathered by the government is private and will be
protected. Because of that expectation, article

1,

section

14

of the Utah

Constitution requires the police to have a warrant supported by probable cause or
to qualify for an exception to those requirements. The police in this case had
neither.
Oryall urges the Court to reject the State's cynical and/ or wrongheaded
approach to the relationship between the courts and the legislature when it
comes to what the public expects will be private. The courts do not exclusively
own the responsibility and opportunity to examine modern life and consider what
we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in. The legislature's input, while not
controlling, should certainly be persuasive on this question. And the legislature's
recognition of our right to privacy in this information in this instance is reason
enough for the Court to find, as the legislature did, that Oryall had a legitimate
expectation of privacy, and that the police were subject to the constitutional
limitation of warrants, probable cause, or exigent circumstances before access to
this information was available.

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

To the extent that there is any validity to the State's argument, citing the
district court, that there is a legitimate public policy in enforcing the laws related
to driver licenses and the like, this policy is still subject to constitutional review.
Just like there is public policy in enforcing the drug laws, or the any other
criminal or civil law that intersects with the private lives of individuals, that
policy must be tempered and limited, and must not trample upon the
fundamental rights of the people to security and privacy in their homes and in
their persons and in their effects. Simply claiming that this public policy
outweighs the constitution is both legally wrong and dangerous to our
constitutional system. The district court's and the State's bald assertions that
public policy defeats the constitution in this case should be rejected.
CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RELIEF SOUGHT

Oryall asks that this court reverse the district court's denial of her motion
to suppress, and remand this matter to the district court with instructions that
she be allowed to withdraw her plea and that the evidence collected as a result of
the illegal search be suppressed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of January, 2018.
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